Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Associated Electric Supply, Inc. v. Shirl B. Inkley,
Inkley Construction, The Corporation of The
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, United Pacific Insurance
Company : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lora C. Siegler; Attorney for Appellant.
Joseph R. Fox Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Associated Electric Supply v. Inkley, No. 890735 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2390

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
Kf U
50
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
.A10
DOCKET NO.

HtlSS-CA

ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC SUPPLY,
INC., a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
NO. 890735-CA

v.
SHIRL B. INKLEY, an individual
d/b/a INKLEY CONSTRUCTION,
THE CORPORATION OF
THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, and UNITED
PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Appeal from the Judgment of the 3d
District Court for Salt Lake County
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick, Judge

LORA C. SIEGLER (#4142)
1399 South 700 East, Suite #12

Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
(801) 484-5570
Attorney for Appellant
Joseph R. Fox
9160 South 300 West
Sandy, Utah 84070
Attorney for Respondent

3 ?p°n
Mary 7 Mo. *
Clark cf tr * ..

Argument priority classification number 14(b).

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

6

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

. . . . .

6

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

6

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES .

7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Course of the Proceedings
Description of the Disposition at Trial Court
Statement of the Relevant Facts

7
7
7
8
8

.
...

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

14

ARGUMENT
Abuse of Discretion in Failure to Grant New Trial or
Reopen Evidence
Irregularity in Proceedings and Accident or Surprise . .
Errors of Law

15
15
16
20

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

27

ADDENDUM
Determinative Statutes
Determinative Rules
Transcript of Judge's Ruling

-Page 2-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Statutes - Utah Code Annotated
Title 14, Ch. 2
Section 14-2-1
Title 38, Ch. 1
Section 38-1-3
Section 38-1-7
Section 38-1-10
Section 58A-la-9
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j)
Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 8
Rule 9(c)
Rule 52
Rule 56
Rule 59
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration
Rule 4-504
Cases
Brooks v. Monroe Systems For Business, Inc.
873 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1989)
Calvert & Marsh Coal Co., Inc. v. Pass
393 So. 2d 955 (Ala. 1980)
Clouser v. Spaniol Ford, Inc,
522 P.2d 1360 (Wyo. 1974)
Doty, et al. v. Town of Cedar Hills
656 P.2d 993 (Utah 1982)
Drury v, Lunceford
415 P-2d 662, 18 Utah 2d 74 (1966)
Ertman v. City of Olympia
621 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1980)

-Page 3-

Estate of Christensen v. Christensen
655 P.2D 646 (Utah 1982)
Fort Howard Paper Company v. Standard Havens, Inc.
119 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Wis. 1988)
Geneva Pipe Company v. S & H Insurance Company
(January 21, 1986, Utah S.Ct. slip opinion)
Guthrie v. Northwestern Hut. Life Ins. Co.
208 S.E. 2d 60 (W.V. 1974)
Hansen v. Stewart
761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988)
John J. Ming, Inc. v. District Court
446 P.2d 907 (Mont. 1970)
Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of Hartford
608 P.2d 1299 (Wyo. 1980),
aff'd 630 P.2d 514, cert. den. 454 U.S. 1118
Marcotte v. Harrison
443 A.2d 1225 (R.I. 1982)
Mattson v. Julian
678 P.2d 654, 209 Mont. 48 (Mont. 1984),
aff'd 710 P.2d 707 (1985)
Mesolella v. City of Providence
508 A.2d 661, 666 (R.I. 1986)
Mutuelle Generale Francaise Vie v. Life Assur. Co.
688 F.S. 386 (N.D. 111. 1988)
Price-Orem Invest. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell
713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986)
Redevelopment Comm'n of City of Washington v. Grimes
178 SE 2d 345 (N.C. 1971)
Rosales v. AT&T Information Systems. Inc.
702 F.Supp. 1489 (D. Colo. 1988)
Royal McBee Corporation v. Bryant
217 A.2d 603 (D.C. 1966)
Runnemede Owners, Inc. v. Crest Morta. Corp.
861 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1988)

-Page 4-

Sullivan v. McCarthy
314 P.2d 901, 902, (Colo. 1957)
Treasure State Industries v. Leigland
151 Mont. 288, 443 P.2d 22 (1968)
Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail. Inc,
652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982)
Western Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Rodriguez
567 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1977)
Williams v. Barber
765 P.2d 887 ( Utah 1988)

-Page 5-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint
and denial of Plaintiff's motion for a new trial or to reopen the
evidence by the trial court•

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

The trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant

Plaintiff's motion at trial to reopen the evidence and Plaintiff's
subsequent Motion for a New Trial or to Reopen the Evidence in
that Plaintiff's failure to present the evidence on the remaining
points

was

caused

by

confusing

rulings

of

the

Court

and

Defendants' counsel's failure to prepare orders within the scope
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

The trial court improperly ruled, as a matter of law,

that Plaintiff had failed to prove certain conditions precedent to
recovery when there was no issue at hand with respect to such
conditions.
3.

The trial court improperly ruled, as a matter of law,

that the burden was upon Plaintiff to show that Title 58A had been
complied with when there was no evidence in the record that any
payments had been made and that Defendants had adequately plead
and proven the defense of estoppel and waiver.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated, Title 38, Chapter 1, with respect to the
mechanic's lien: and Title 14, Chapter 2, with respect to the
bond: and Section 58A-la-9, with respect to the payments to the
supplier: Addendum pages 1-6.
Rule 9(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure with respect
to the pleading of the failure of conditions precedent: Addendum
pages 7-8.
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration:
Addendum page 9.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case
The Plaintiff, an electrical materials supplier, supplied

materials to a sub-contractor for a building project known as the
"Hunter Ward Project1' and were not paid for a substantial amount
of such materials.

Plaintiff complained against the Defendants

for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien under Title 38, payment on a
bond

under

Title

14

and

an

action

in quantum

meruit.

The

Defendants were the property owner, general contractor and bond
underwriter.
2.

Course of the Proceedings
Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint and Answer, both

parties proceeded with discovery.

Plaintiff then made a motion

for summary judgment and a hearing was held on that matter.

After

additional discovery, Plaintiff filed a certificate of readiness
for trial and trial was held on June 14, 1989.
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At the close of

Plaintiff's presentation of evidence, Defendants moved to dismiss
Counts I and II of the Complaint on the basis that Plaintiff had
failed to prove a prima facie case under Titles 38 and 14. After
argument, that motion was granted and Plaintiff's motion to reopen
the evidence was denied.
Thereafter, the trial court granted Defendants attorney's
fees.

Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial or to reopen the

evidence.
3.

Upon submission to the court, that motion was denied.

Description of the Disposition at Trial Court
On Defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of Plaintiff's

case, the trial court found that Plaintiff had failed to establish
compliance with the notice requirements of Title 14, failed to
establish compliance with the lien filing requirements of Title 38
and failed to establish that Title 58A was complied with.

The

court then granted Defendant's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff's motion at trial to reopen the evidence and Count
III of the Complaint were not addressed by the trial court.
Plaintiff's subsequent motion for a new trial or to reopen the
evidence was denied by the court without written comment.
4.

Statement of the Relevant Facts
a-

On March 11, 1987, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this

matter which contained three separate counts:

(1) for foreclosure

of a Mechanic's Lien pursuant to Utah Code Annotated ("U.C.A."),
Title 38; (2) for payment pursuant to a theory of Quantum Meruit;
and

(3) for payment pursuant to a construction bond to U.C.A.

Title 14. (Record at 2-12.)
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b.
Paragraph

The
#10

Complaint
(Record

included
at

one

4 ) , with

general

respect

allegation,

to

having

met

in
the

requirements of U.C.A. Title 38, Chapter 1, and several specific
allegations with respect to such requirements as follows:
(1)
that

the

Paragraph

*~

requirement

(Record
for

at

having

3) specifically
furnished

the

alleged

materials

pursuant to U.C.A. Section 38-1-3 was met; and
(2)

Paragraph

#10

(Record

at 4) specifically

alleged

that the requirement for having filed the Lien in accordance
with U.C.A. Section 38-1-7 was met; and

that

(3)

Paragraph

#12

the

requirements

(Record at 4) specifically
for having made

dememd

alleged

pursuant

to

incorporated

as

U.C.A. Section 38-1-7 was met.
(4)

Paragraph

#15

(Record at 5, 8-9)

part of the Complaint a copy of the Mechanic's Lien which was
filed with the Complaint as an exhibit.
(5)

Paragraph #23 (Record at 6 and 10) incorporated as

part of the Complaint a copy of the construction bond which
was filed with the Complaint as an exhibit.
c.
at

27)

On March 27, 1987, Defendants filed a single Answer (Record
which

denied,

without

further

specifics,

the

allegations

contained in Paragraphs 7 through 10, 11, 13 through 22 and 24 of the
Complaint and which alleged two "affirmative defenses11:
(1)

That of Waiver and Estoppel (Record at 28); and

(2)

That of payment in full or failure to give proper

credit for payment (Record at 28) .
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d.

The Answer contained no other specifics or particulars with

respect to the denial of any of the other allegations of the Plaintiffs
or with respect to the exhibits filed with the Complaint (Record at 2729) .
e.

On February 16, 1988, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment (Record at 50, supported by the Affidavit of Gailen Hess, the
President of Plaintiff, which included the following specific facts:
(1)

That Plaintiff filed a Lien on April 29, 1986 which

was attached to the Affidavit as an exhibit (Hess Affidavit,
Par. 3, Record at 62); and
(2)

That

Plaintiff

made

demand

on

each

of

the

Defendants by letter dated May 7, 1986 which was attached to
the Affidavit as an exhibit (Hess Affidavit, Par. 4, Record
at 62-63); and
(3)

That

materials

were

the

invoices

furnished

show
as

that the

stated

in

first
the

and

Lien

last
(Hess

Affidavit, Par. #10 and 11, Record 63-64).
f.

On

Plaintiff's

March

4,

1988,

Defendants

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

filed

their

which

was

opposition

supported

by

to
an

affidavit which did not address any of the facts in Paragraph 5, above.
(Record 160-163.)
g.

On April 4, 1988, a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment was held after which Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
was denied and Defendants' counsel was instructed to prepare the Order.
(Record 170-171.)
h.

During

such hearing, Plaintiff's counsel believed that the
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Court had made the following rulings pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure ("U.R.C.P.") (Record 271-273):
(1)

That the only remaining issues for trial were (a)

which of the invoiced items were actually used in the project
and

(b) which of the invoiced items had Plaintiff received

payment for (Siegler Affidavit, Par. #5, Record at 272); and
(2)

That there were no questions of fact with respect

to the validity of the Lien, the Notices and Demands and the
timeliness

of the filings

of Lien

and the filing

of the

Complaint (Siegler Affidavit, Par. #5, Record at 272).
i.

At the close of the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment, Plaintiff's counsel specifically requested clarification of
the rulings which the Court had made pursuant to Rule 56(d) and was
told by the Court "That's all I have to say".

(Siegler Affidavit, Par.

#6, Record at 272).
j.

Defendants' counsel apparently neglected to prepare, file and

serve the Order with respect to the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment and the minute entry on the matter indicates only that
the Motion was denied (Record at 171).
k.

In answer to Plaintiff's requests for production of documents,

Defendants'

counsel

provided

Plaintiff's

counsel

files of Defendants' counsel in this matter.

with

the original

Such files included the

originals of the notices and demands required by Titles 38 and 14 of
the Utah Code Annotated.
1.

On April 24, 1989, a telephonic "Pre-Trial Conference" was

held during which no mention of the issues to be tried was made and no
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Pre-Trial Order resulted in an enumeration of the issues.
m.

On June 14, 1989, the trial in this matter was held.

n.

At the outset of the Trial, Plaintiff's counsel requested

some clarification of the Court's rulings pursuant to Rule 56(d) as to
the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and was informed
by the Court only that "The Motion had been denied" (Transcript of
Trial at 3).
o.

At trial Plaintiff's counsel, in full belief that only two

issues were to be tried and in the interest of not wasting the Court's
and Counsels' time, presented Plaintiff's evidence that all of the
invoiced

materials

were

actually

used

in

the

project

(Siegler

Affidavit, Par. #7, Record at 272).
p.

At trial, a Stipulation was entered into that certain of the

invoices and all of the payments which had been at issue were no longer
at issue and would not be contested by either party (Transcript at 33).
q.

At

trial

Defendants'

counsel

cross-examined

Plaintiff's

witnesses with respect to the use of the materials in the project and
certain of the account records of the Plaintiff (Transcript at 17).
r.

At trial no evidence was introduced with respect to any

payments made by any person on any account with Plaintiff other than
the payments involved in the Stipulation or with respect to any matter
which could be considered to have concerned "Waiver" or "Estoppel"
(Transcript at 33).
s.

At the close of the Plaintiff's presentation of evidence,

Defendants moved for dismissal of Count I of the Complaint on the
grounds that Plaintiff had not proven the contents or validity of the
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lien or that the conditions of Title 38 had been met and Defendants
moved for dismissal of Count III of the Complaint on the grounds that
Plaintiff

had

Defendants1
Defendants

not

counsel
would

Complaint

shown

if

stated

have

the

that

to

Court

Title

at

58A

that

present
found

had

time

that

evidence

that

been

as

he

to

Plaintiffs

complied

with.

believed

Count

had

II

that

of

proven,

by

the
a

preponderance of the evidence, that the materials invoiced were used in
the project (Transcript at 28-31) .
t.

to Defendants1

In response

Motion to

Dismiss, Plaintiff's

counsel argued as follows:
(1)

Counsel had been under the impression that all of

the conditions precedent to the lien foreclosure
action

had

been

previously

found

to

have

and bond

been

proven

(Transcript at 32); and
(2)
permitted

That
to

if

such

reopen

was
its

not

the

case,

Plaintiff

case

to

prove

those

be

issues

(Transcript at 33); and
(3)

That the burden of proving the matters under Title

58A was on the Defendants and that no payments were in issue
and

no

proof

had

been

submitted

with

respect

to

the

accounting for any payments (Transcript at 33);
u.

At the close of Plaintiff's response to Defendants1 Motion to

Dismiss, Plaintiff's counsel requested that, should the Court decide
that Plaintiff's counsel was incorrect with respect to the issues to be
tried, Plaintiff be permitted to reopen its case in order to present
evidence with respect to the remaining issues (Transcript at 33).
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v.

Neither

the

Court

nor

Defendants1

counsel

stated

that

Plaintiff's counsel was incorrect with respect to its memory of events
at the summary judgment hearing.
w.

Plaintiff had at trial, and has at this time, the means by

which to prove the elements of its case which the Defendant claimed
were not in evidence.

(Affidavit of Siegler, Par. #9; Affidavit of

Susan Carpenter, Par. #2-6, Record at 271-273 and 269-270)
x.

The Court, after taking the matter under advisement, stated

its findings and conclusions as shown in the transcript of those
proceedings and dismissed Plaintiff's action.
y.

On July 25, 1989, Plaintiff moved the Court for a New Trial or

to Reopen the Evidence (Record at 274).
2.

Defendants1 counsel responded to such Motion but never stated

that Plaintifffs counsel was incorrect with respect to its memory of
events at the summary judgment hearing (Record at 284).
aa.

On August 8, 1989, Plaintiff's motion was denied and, on

September 15, 1989, Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal (Record at
300) .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Due to the irregularity of the proceedings leading to trial,
Plaintiff was not permitted to present all of its evidence to the trial
court.

Further, the trial court incorrectly ruled on several material

issues of law which were determinative of the disposition of the
action.
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ARGUMENT
1.

Abuse

of

Discretion

in Failure to Grant

Hev Trial or Reopen

Evidence.
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
Court may grant a new trial due to irregularity in the proceedings of
the Court, insufficiency

of evidence or error in law, among other

reasons.
While it is left to the broad discretion of the trial court to
grant a new trial, in deciding whether to do so, the Court is required
to determine both whether the moving party received a fair and just
trial in the first instance fPrury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662, 18 Utah
2d 74 (1966)) and whether the moving party could prevail at a new
trial.

(Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988): H[A] new trial

may be granted whenever there is evidence that would have permitted
entry of a judgment for the losing party.";

See also, Price-Orer

Invest. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel1, 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986), where
the court stated:

"[I]t appears that substantial evidence existed to

justify the verdict in favor of [Appellant] Rollins, Brown.

Under such

circumstances, we must sustain the trial court's ultimate decision to
grant a new trial.")
In addition to these determinations, the Rules of Civil Procedure
are to be interpreted, and these standards are to be applied, in such a
manner that justice and fairness ultimately prevail.

Further, pursuant

to Rule 8 "[a] 11 pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice."

In

Drury

(supra, at

663) the Court

stated

that "The

objective of all Rules of Procedure is that the parties have a full and
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fair opportunity for a trial and determination of the issues in dispute
between them."
Fairness will ultimately prevail where a fair trial is had and
where no prejudice occurs from the granting of a new trial.

" [I]f no

intervening rights have attached in reliance upon the judgment, and no
actual injustice will ensue, the relief sought should be granted rather
than denied.

Here the motion was made in reasonable time, was timely

made, and good reason appears for the relief requested."

John J. Ming,

Inc. v. District Court, 446 P.2d 907, 910 (Mont. 1970).
In this action, the trial court erred

in refusing to permit-

Plaintiff to present its full evidence and abused its discretion in
refusing to grant Plaintiff

a new trial in that:

(1) Plaintiff's

failure to present such evidence was caused by the irregularity in the
proceedings of the trial court; and (2) Plaintiff was not required, by
law, to present such evidence; and (3) Plaintiff was denied a fair
trial on the facts due to the trial court's rulings.
2.

Irregularity in Proceedings and Accident or Surprise
Pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rules 59 (a)(1) and (3), irregularity in the

proceedings of the Court and accident or surprise are two of the
grounds for granting a new trial.
"Irregularity

of proceedings" may

include such occurrences as

confusion of the parties as to orders, a change of ruling of the Court
without adequate notice to the parties, ex parte proceedings, etc.
In Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887, (1988) the Utah Supreme Court
granted a new trial to the Plaintiff based upon the confusion of
Plaintiff over a ruling by the Court pursuant to Rule 56(d).
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The

Plaintiff in that case had "assumed" that such ruling had resolved
certain issues in his favor and had not proceeded to prove such issues
at trial.

The trial court ruled against the Plaintiff, however, due to

Plaintiff's failure to prove those very issues.

In granting a new

trial to the Plaintiff, the Utah Supreme Court stated in its conclusion
that it was so ruling due to "the uncertainty and confusion of counsel
for both parties at trial and the lack of clarity in the trial court's
ruling on the relevance of evidence. . . . "

In a concurring opinion,

Justice Zimmerman stated the very matter at issue here:
Apparently, during trial the Judge changed his mind . . . .
Such a change of mind was entirely within the trial judge's
power under Rule 56(c).
However, he did not give counsel
adequate notice of his change of mind.
As a consequence,
William's counsel was caught by surprise and . . . was
unfairly prejudiced because his counsel was unprepared to
proceed on that element. A remand for further proceedings on
this point is therefore merited.
Id. at 891.
In

the

instant

"irregularities":

case,

four

occurrences

may

be

termed

(1) the failure of Defendants' counsel to produce

the Order with respect to the Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) the
statement of the Court that no findings were made pursuant to Rule
56(d) on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment;
dismissal

of

Plaintiff's

Quantum

Meruit

(3) the Court's

claim without

any motion

therefor; and (4) the Court's failure to permit Plaintiff to reopen its
case despite a request to do so.
occurrences also resulted

The first and second of these

in prejudicial surprise to the Plaintiff

which the Plaintiff tried diligently to avoid.
Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, and its
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predecessor which was in effect at the time, would have required
Defendants1 counsel, in accordance with the Court's instructions, to
prepare the Order within 15 days of the hearing.

This Order was not

filed or served at all.
Rule 56(d) provides that, where a Motion for Summary Judgment does
not dispose of all of the issues, the Court shall make findings and
narrow the issues for trial where practicable.
sometimes

referred

to

as

"Partial

Summary

Such an Order, while

Judgment" can

also be

referred to by other names since, as stated in Clouser v. Spaniol Ford,
Inc. , 522 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Wyo. 1974), "this is a misnomer and might
more properly be described as an Interlocutory Order or a Partial
Summary Adjudication, narrowing the scope of the trial and defining the
issues".

As such, the Order "should be entered sufficiently ahead of

time to allow for litigants to prepare for the trial."

Id. at 1364.

While, pursuant to Rule 52, the Court is not required to produce
an Order with respect to a ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment the
failure to do so, or the failure to enter accurate, clear and concise
findings, has often been the cause for the granting of a new trial.
See, e.g., Williams v. Barber, supra; Clouser v. Spaniol Ford, Inc.,
supra; and Calvert & Marsh Coal Co., Inc. v. Pass, 393 So. 2d 955 (Ala.
1980).
In the instant case, despite the fact that the Court did not
credit Plaintiff's counsel with accurately remembering the findings of
the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, it is evident
that the failure of the Court and of Defendants1 counsel to produce an
Order in that regard is the cause of Plaintiff's counsel's failure to

-Page 18-

present the further evidence which the Court apparently would have
required in Plaintiff's case.

This is evident in that: (a) Plaintiff's

counsel requested a clarification of this issue more than once prior to
the trial's beginning;

(b) Plaintiff could have clearly proven the

items which the Defendant contended were not in evidence; and (c)
Plaintiff's counsel put on proof only with respect to the facts which
it believed remained in issue.
Whether Plaintiff's counsel accurately remembered the events has
become irrelevant in that the confusion which resulted from the lack of
a written Order and from the lack of clarification of the Court's
rulings caused Plaintiff to fail to produce the competent evidence
which it possessed and, thus, caused the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint.

Indeed, just as in the Williams case, "At the end of the

trial, during the announcement of its rulings, Appellant's counsel
expressed surprise" at the Court's ruling due to the confusion and
uncertainty
proceedings.

caused

by

the

irregularity

(Williams, at 890.)

of

the

Court's

prior

See also, Calvert & Marsh, supra,

describing the actions needed to be taken, and taken by Plaintiff in
this matter, to attempt to avoid such a situation.
Indeed, Plaintiff's counsel was further surprised when the Court
ruled that, even though

Plaintiff had shown that it had supplied

materials for the project in question and even though there had been no
evidence presented with respect to the payment for those materials and
even

though

Defendants

did

not move to dismiss

Count

II of the

Complaint, the Court proceeded to dismiss Count II.
It was a further error of the Court not to permit Plaintiff,
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pursuant to the request of Plaintiff's counsel, to reopen its case in
order to introduce the evidence which the Court determined was lacking
at that time.
from

It was clear from the Plaintiff's previous pleadings and

Plaintiff's

response

to

Defendants' Motion

to

Dismiss

that

Plaintiff had not introduced such evidence because it had been under
the impression that it was unnecessary and would be a waste of time and
redundant.
3.

Ertman v. City of Olvmpia, 621 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1980).

Errors of Law
Pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(7), error in law is one of the

grounds for granting a new trial.

The Utah Supreme Court has regarded

this subsection as one of the most important reasons for granting a new
trial.

In Dotv, et al. v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 P.2d 993, 997

(1982), the Court stated: "Thus, because of the errors of law by the
trial court in granting summary judgment against the Defendant, the
subsequent denial by the trial court of the Defendants1 Motion to Amend
Judgment or for a New Trial was an abuse of discretion which compounded
rather than cured the original errors."
In the instant case, there were three errors in law, each of which
significantly prejudiced

the Plaintiff and each of which

entitles

Plaintiff to a new trial: (1) the Court erroneously ruled that the
Plaintiff had not proven that it had met the conditions of Titles 38
and 14 with respect to the filing of the lien, the filing of the
Complaint, the notice requirements and the demand requirements; and (2)
the Court erroneously ruled that "the burden is on the Plaintiff tc
establish . . . that title 58-50-10 was complied with" and that that
burden had not been met; and (3) that Defendants had adequately plead
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and proven estoppel and waiver.
The Court erroneously ruled that the Plaintiff did not meet its
burden

to

establish

evidence

of

compliance

with

Section

14-2-1

regarding notice and that a valid lien was filed in compliance with
Section 38-1-10.

In fact, such compliance had been established by the

original Complaint and Answer and had not been in issue thereafter.
Rule 9(c) of the U.R.C.P. states:
In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions
precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all
conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A
denial of performance or occurrence shall be made
specifically and with particularity, and when so made the
party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the
trial establish the facts showing such performance or
occurrence.
As cited in Runnemede Owners, Inc. v. Crest Mortg. Corp., 861 F.2d
1053, 1057 (7th Cir. 1988), C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure, 1302 and 1304 states:
Rule 9(c) is designed to eliminate the detailed and
largely unnecessary averments that resulted under the common
law procedure, and to prevent nonmeritorious dismissals for
failure to plead the underlying fulfillment of conditions
precedent that are not at issue in the suit. . . .
[B]ut, [a] party who intends to controvert the
claimant's general allegation of performance is . . . given
the burden of identifying those conditions he believes are
unfulfilled and wishes to put into issue; he cannot raise an
issue of performance by a general denial. ••
It

is

axiomatic

that

in

generally

alleging

performance

of

conditions precedent, the Plaintiff need not use the exact language of
the rule but may so otherwise generally allege such occurrence.

See,

e.g., Rosales v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc., 702 F.Supp. 1489 (D.
Colo. 1988); Guthrie v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 208 S.E. 2d 60
(W.V. 1974); and Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of Hartford, 60S P.2d

-Page 21-

1299

(Wyo.

Indeed,

1980),

the

aff'd

general

630

P.2d

allegation

may

514, cert.
be

couched

den. 454 U.S. 1118.
in terms

of having

performed under the law or having complied with a statute.
Generale Francaise Vie v. Life Assur. Co., 688 F.S. 386
1988).

Mutuelle
(N.D. 111.

See also, Redevelopment Comm'n of City of Washington v. Grimes,

178 SE 2d 345 (N.C. 1971).
The Courts, both Federal and State, have ruled time and time again
that the effect of this rule is that the failure to plead such denial
with

specificity

defense.
F.R.D.

Fort Howard

397

A.2d 603

and

particularity

results

in

Paper Company v. Standard

the

waiver

of

the

Havens, Inc., 119

(E.D. Wis. 1988); Royal McBee Corporation v. Bryant, 217

(D.C. 1966); Mattson v. Julian, 678 P.2d 654, 209 Mont. 48

(Mont. 1984), aff'd 710 P.2d 707 (1985); and Marcotte v. Harrison, 443
A.2d 1225 (R.I. 1982).

Some courts have phrased it in such a way that

the failure to deny with specificity and particularity is an admission
that such conditions were fulfilled.
In Treasure State Industries v. Leigland, 151 Mont. 288,
443 P. 2d 22, decided after Montana's adoption of Rule 9(c),
we stated:
'The conditions precedent referred to in this rule
are those the performance or occurrence of which
are prerequisite to a claim upon which relief can
be granted. In most instances there is no question
of the performance of conditions precedent and Rule
9(c) thus puts the burden on the defendant to raise
the issuer when there is actually a question.
Under this rule a general denial will not put the
performance or occurrence of any condition in
issue.' . . .
Other authorities are in agreement with the Treasure
State Industries rule.
1 Moore's Federal Practice Rules
Pamphlet Par. 9.3[3] (1984); McKee-Berger-Mansueto v. Board
of Education (7th Cir. 1980), 626 F.2d 559.
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. No specific denial of any condition precedent
appears in Julian's pleadings. Julian never moved to amend
his pleadings or for a continuance despite the lengthy period
between the filing of pleadings and trial. Having failed to
plead denial of a condition precedent with specificity or
particularity, Julian's testimony of alleged defective
performance and failure to correct was properly rejected.
[Citations omitted.]
. . .In either case Julian failed to follow the simple
pleading procedures designed to give notice to the opposing
party and to narrow the issues for trial.
Mattson. at 657-8.
The

Courts

have

further

agreed

that

the

"mere

assertion of

'failure to state a claim' was not specific enough to join the issue."
Brooks v. Monroe Systems For Business, Inc., 873 F.2d 202 (8th Cir.
1989)f rehearing denied June 5, 1989.
Plaintiff generally plead all of the conditions precedent to the
foreclosure of the Mechanic's Lien and to the filing of .the Complaint
on the Bond and Defendant failed to deny the performance or occurrence
of any of these conditions specifically and with particularity as
required by Rule 9(c).

In fact, the only items in Defendants' Answer

which were specific and particular, if any, were the second and third
affirmative defenses, neither of which dealt with any of these issues.
In fact, Defendants did not raise such issues even in opposition
to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

As in Treasure State

Industries, supra, there is the additional problem that the Defendant,
throughout the proceedings failed to produce any evidence that any of
these conditions had not been met.

In fact, "[t]he [Defendant] never

raised the issue until it made its motion to dismiss at the end of the
. . . hearing —

after filing its answer, after stipulating to the

-Page 23

severance

of

the

damage

issue

from

the

equitable

issues, after

stipulating to an agreed statement of facts that listed the costs
incurred by Mesolella • . . ".

Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508

A.2d 661, 666 (R.I. 1986).
Therefore, Plaintiff was not required to present any evidence at
trial as to these matters since they were not in issue.

In Sullivan v.

McCarthy, 314 P.2d 901, 902, (Colo. 1957), the Court stated:
Rule 9(c) . . . permits a Plaintiff to plead generally the
performance of all conditions. If an adverse party denies
the performance of any such conditions the rule requires that
such denial
"shall be made specifically and with
particularity."
Thus specific issues are framed, and the
Plaintiff, while obligated to establish the performance of
those conditions within the framed issues, is under no
obligation to prove the performance of conditions other than
those with reference to which Defendant has specifically
alleged failure to perform.
In fact, Defendants assertion of the defense with respect tc
lack of notice pursuant to the statutes would have been frivolous and
asserted in bad faith as shown by their own files.
Title 58A provides, in essence, that when a materialman is
providing materials for a subcontractor on more than one project the
materialman must demand to know which project any payment from the
contractor, property owner or subcontractor is for and must credit the
proper project or it is a defense to the claim that "a payment made, by
the owner to the contractor for the materials has been so designated,
and paid over to the subcontractor or materialman, and that when the
payment was received by the subcontractor or materialman he did not
demand a designation of the account and of the items of account tc
which the payment was to be applied."
The Utah Supreme Court, in Western Ready Mix Concrete Co. v«
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Rodriguez. 567 P.2d 1118, 1120 (1977), affirmed in Geneva Pipe Company
v. S & H Insurance Company (January 21, 1986 slip opinion) interpreted
this section of the statute as follows:
The statute set out is plain and the meaning is clear•
If an owner has more than one property being improved by the
same contractor, he must designate which property is to be
credited when he makes a payment to the contractor . . . when
a contractor has an account with a materialman, which
includes material furnished to jobs other than that of an
owner who pays the contractor, the statute requires that
materialman to make inquiry as to the job to be credited for
any money paid by the contractor." (Emphasis added.)
Since it is a defense, the contractor must show that a payment
made was either: (1) not specifically designated and the materialman
did not demand such designation; or (2) was designated and was credited
to the wrong account.
Since no evidence was submitted with respect to payments, other
than the payments which were stipulated as properly applied, no prima
facie case was made that such a defense even existed and Plaintiff was
not required to address the defense in its case.

In fact, no such

evidence could have been adduced had the burden been properly placed on
the Defendants because no such evidence exists.
The Court's finding that the burden was on the Plaintiff to show
that it had complied with Title 58A was erroneous and its dismissal
with respect to the failure of proof in this matter was erroneous
because there is no proof in the record or elsewhere that any payment
was not designated or was incorrectly credited.
consisted

of

internal bookkeeping

The Defendants "proof"

records of the Plaintiff which,

Defendants admitted, were not the only records kept by the Plaintiff
and represented internal accounts only.
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In their Answer, Defendants plead the defenses of "waiver and
estoppel" based upon an alleged conversation which took place between
an employee of one of the Defendants and an employee of the Plaintiff
in October of 1985.
Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298, 13011302 (Utah 1982) presented a set of circumstances very similar to those
of this case in this regard.
Plaintiff

is estopped

In that case, the Defendant argued "that

from asserting

its claim under the bonding

statute because of its failure to give timely Notice of Default to
Defendant

and

its extension of credit to Bell Construction after

default."

The Court rejected that argument and stated:

The doctrine of estoppel applies when one party
knowingly induces another by some act or admission to take a
detrimental course of action.
Defendant acknowledges that
there had been no contact or communication between itself and
Plaintiff.
Without contact or communication of any kind,
Plaintiff could not have communicated or induced Defendant
into any type of detrimental conduct."
Even taking Defendants1 evidence on this point in its best light
and without taking

into account its credibility or accuracy, such

evidence merely indicates two things: (1) that the Plaintiff regarded
the account of Old Trapper Electric as "current" at the time of the
conversation; and (2) that thereafter Defendant Inkley began paying the
Old Trapper Electric account by joint check.
Even the Defendants do not allege that on the date of the
supposed conversation Old Trapper Electric did not owe any monies to
the Plaintiff
account

and the Plaintiff has testified that, in fact, th6

in question was only a matter of days from being deemed

delinquent.
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Thus, the statement which may have been made by an employee of
the

Plaintiff

may

have

been

misconstrued

by

an

employee

of the

Defendant.
However, misconstrued or not, the fact is that the statement did
not induce any behavior: the change in the behavior of Defendant Inkley
was

to

further

subcontractor

protect

itself

by

using

joint

payments

and materialman, rather than to change

to

the

its behavior

toward a more risky position.
Thus, on its face and pursuant to the evidence provided by the
Defendants, such a defense must fall under the standards of Triple I,
supra, and the remaining case law.

See also Estate of Christensen v.

Christensen, 655 P.2D 646 (Utah 1982).

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
In summation, Plaintiff submits that the trial court committed
material errors in denying Plaintiff's motions for the reopening of the
evidence and in denying Plaintifffs motion for a new trial and in
making

material

errors

in

its

legal

conclusions

such

that

the

disposition of this case was not the disposition which this system of
legal justice requires.
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Respectfully submitted on this 15th day of January, 1990.

/s/ Lora C. Siegler
Lora C. Siegler
Attorney for Appellant
1399 South 700 East, Suite #12
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
(801) 484-5570
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LIENS
Chapter
1 Mechanics' Laens
2 Miscellaneous Liens
3 Lessors' Liens
4 Common Carriers' Liens
5 Judgment Lien — United States Courts
6 Federal Tax Liens
7 Hospital Lien Law
8 Self-service Storage Facilities
9 Penalty for Wrongful Lien
10 Oil, Gas and Mining Liens
CHAPTER 1
MECHANICS' LIENS
Section
38-1-1
38-1-2
38-1-3
38-1-4
38-1-5
38-1-6
38 1-7
38-1-8
38-1-9
38-1-10
38-1 11
38-1-12
38-1-13
38-1-14
38-1-15
38-1-16
38-1 17
38-1-18
38-1-19
38-1-20
38-1-21
38-1-22
38-1-23
38 1-24
3&-1 25
38-1-26

Public buildings not subject to act
"Contractors* and "subcontractors* defined.
Those entitled to ben — What may be attached
Amount of land affected — Lots and subdivisions — Franchises, fixtures, and appurtenances
Pnonty — Over other encumbrances
Pnonty over claims of creditors of ongmal
contractor or subcontractor
Notice of claim — Contents — Recording —
Service on owner of propert>
Liens on several separate properties in one
claim
Notice imparted by record
Laborers' and matenalmen's hen on equal
footing regardless of time of filing
Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens —
Action for debt not affected.
Repealed.
Parties — Joinder — Intervention
Decree — Order of satisfaction
Sale — Redemption — Disposition of proceeds
Deficiency judgment
Costs — Apportionment — Costs ana attorneys' fee to subcontractor
Attorneys' fees
Payment b\ owner to contra etc1* — Subcon
tractors hen not affected
When contract pnee not payable in cash —
Notice
Advance payments — Effect on subcontractor's ben
Advance payments under terns of contract
— Effect on bens
Creditors cannot reach matenais fur
nished, except ftr purchas-e pnee
Cance' anon of reco^c — Pena *\
Abuse of hen ngrn — Pena~:\
Assignment of ben

ADDENDUM

3&-M

LIENS

Section
38-1-27. Preliminary notice — Form of Dotice —
Contents of nouce — Notice of commencement — County clerks to maintain, index file — Payment of fees
38-1-1. Public buildings not subject to act
The provisions of this chapter shal not apply to
any public building, structure or improvement
isss
38-1-2. "Contractors" and n subcon tractors" defined.
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by contract, express or implied with, the owner, as in this
chapter provided shaL be deemed an original contractor, and all other persons doing work or furnishing materials shall be deemed subcontractors.
ISSS
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No attachment, garnishment or levy under an execution upon any money due to an original contracior
from the owner of any property subject to Hen under
this chapter shall be valid as against any ben of a
subcontractor or materialmsji, and no such attachment, garnishment or levy upon any money due to s
subcontractor or materialman from the contractor
shall be valid as against any hen of a laborer employed by the day or piece.
1955

38-1-7. Notice of claim — Contents — Recording
— Service on owner of property.
(1) Each contractor or other person who claims the
benefit of this chapter within 80 days after substantial completion of the project or improvement shall
file for record with the county recorder of the county
in which the property, or some part of the proper: y. u
situated, a written notice to hold and t:\n\m a lien.
38-1-3. Those entitled to ben — What may be
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting
attached.
forth the following information:
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons per(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or,
forming any services or furnishing or renting any
if not known, the name of the record owner:
materials or equipment used in the construction, al(V> the name of the person by whom he was
teration, or improvement of any building or structure
employed or to whom he furnished the equipment
or improvement to any premises in any manner and
or material;
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who
(c) the time when the first and last labor or
have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specificaservice was performed or the first and last equiptions, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superinment or material wa* furnished;
tendence, or who have rendered other like profes(d i a description of rcne property, sufficient for
sional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a hen
identification; and
upon the property upon or concerning which they
(e) the signature of the Hen claimant or his
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished
authorized agent and an acknowledgment or ceror rented materials or equipment for the value of the
tificate as required under Chapter 3, Title 57. No
service rendered, labor performed, or materials or
acknowledgment or certificate is required for any
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively,
notice filed after April 29,1985, and before April
whether at the instance of the owner or of any other
. . 24, 1989.
person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien.
otherwise. This lien shall attach only to such interest the Hen claimant shall deliver or mail by certified
as the owner may have in the property.
i&87 mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of
the real property a copy of the notice of lien. If the
38-1-4. A m o u n t of land affected — Lots and sub- record owner's current address is not readily availdivisions — Franchises, fixtures, and able, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the lastappurtenances.
known address of the record owner, using the names
The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to and addresses appearing on the last completed real
and cover so much of the land whereon such building, property assessment rolls, of the county where the afstructure, or improvement shall be made as may be fected property is located. Failure to deliver or mail
necessary for convenient use and occupation of the the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record
land. In case any such building shall occupy two or owner precludes the hen claimant from an award of
more lots or other subdivisions of land, such lots or costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or
subdivisions shall be considered as one for the pur- record owner in an action to enforce the hen.
1989
poses of this chapter. Tne liens provided for in this
chapter shall attach to all franchises privileges, ap- 38-1-8. Liens o n several separate properties in
purtenances, and to all machinery and fixtures, perone claim.
taining to or used in connection with any such lands,
Liens against two or more buildings or other imbuildings, structures, or improvements.
1987 provements owned by the same person may be included in one claim; but in such case the person filing
38-1-5. Priority — Over other e n c u m b r a n c e s .
the claim must designate the amount claimed to be
The Hens herein provided for shall relate back to, due to him on each of such buildings or other imand take effect as of, the time of the commencement provements,
m:
to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the
structure or improvement, and shall have priority 38-1*9. Notice imparted by record.
over any hen, .mortgage or other encumbrance which
(1) The recorder must record the claim in an index
may have attached subsequently to the time when maintained for that purpose.
the building, improvement or structure was com(2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all
menced, work begun, or first material furnished on persons are considered to have notice of the claim.
the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other en1S8cumbrance of which the hen holder had no notice and
which was unrecorded at the time the building, struc- 38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's hen on
ture or improvement was commenced, work begun, or
equal footing regardless of time of filfirst material furnished on the ground.
1&53
ing.
The liens for work and labor done or materia1 fur38-1-6. Priority over claims of creditors of origi- nished as provided in this chapter shall be upon ar.
nal contractor or subcontractor.
equal footing, regardless of date of filing the notici
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and claim of hen and regardless of the time of performing such work and labor or furnishing such me
tenal
IKS
38-1-1L Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens
— Action for debt not affected.
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for
must be begun within twelve months after the com
pletion of the original contract, or the suspension of
work thereunder for a period of thirty days Within
the twelve months herein mentioned the hen claim
ant shall file for record with the county recorder of
each county in which the hen is recorded a notice of
the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in
actions affecting the title or right tc possession of real
property, or the hen shal be void except as to persons who have been made parties to the action and
persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action, and the burden of proof shall be
upon the hen claimant and those claiming under him
to show such actual knowledge Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair or affect the right
of any person to whom a debt may be due for any
work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the same
1953
38-1-12. R e p e a l e d .

issi

38-1-13. Parties — Joinder — Intervention.
Lienors not contesting the claims of each other may
join as plaintiffs, and when separate actions are commenced the court may consolidate them and make all
persons having claims filed parties to the action
Those claiming hens who fail or refuse to become parties plaintiff mav be made parties defendant, and anv
one not made a party may at any time before the final
hearing intervene
1953
38-1-14. Decree — O r d e r of satisfaction.
In even* case in which liens are claimed against the
same property the decree shall provide for their satisfaction in the following order
(1) subcontractors who are laborers or mechanics working by the dav or piece, but without
furnishing materials therefor,
(2 all other subcontractors and all materialmen.
(3) the original contractors
1953
38-1-15. Sale — Redemption — Disposition of
proceeds
The court shall cause the propertv to be sold m
satisfaction of the hens and costs as in the case of
foreclosure of mortgages subject to the same ngnt of
redemption If the proceeds of sale after the payment
of costs shall not be sufficient to satisfy the whole
amount of liens included in the decree, then such proceeds shah be paid in the order above designated, and
pro rata to the persons claiming in each class where
the sum realized is insufficient to pav the persons of
such class in full Any excess shall be paid to the
owner
1953
38-1-16. Deficiency j u d g m e n t
Every person s&ose claim is not satisfied as herein
provided may have judgment docketed for the balance
unpaid, and execution therefor against the party personally liable
1953
38-1-17. Costs — Apportionment — Costs and
attorneys' fee to subcontractor.
As between the owner and the contractor the court
shall apportion the costs according to the right of the
case, but in all cases each subcontractor exhibiting a

38-1-23

lien shall have his costs awarded to him, including
the costs of preparing and recording the notice of
claim of lien and such reasonable attorney's fee as
may be incurred in preparing and recording said notice of clajn of hen.
1961
38-1-18. A t t o r n e y s ' fees.
In an> action brought to enforce any lien under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the
court which shall be taxed as costs in the action
1961

38-1-19. Payment by owner to contractor —
Subcontractor's ben not affected.
When any subcontractor shall have actually begun
to furnish labor or materials for which he is entitled
to a hen no payment to the original contractor shall
impair or defeat such hen, and no alteration of anv
contract shall affect any hen acquired under the provisions of this chapter
1953
38-1-20. When contract p r i c e n o t p a y a b l e in
cash — Notice.
As to all liens except that of the contractor, the
whole contract price shall be payable in money, except as herein provided, and shall not be diminished
by any prior or subsequent indebtedness, offset or
counterclaim in favor of the owner and against the
contractor except when the owner has contracted to
pay otherwise than in cash, in which case the owner
shall post in a conspicuous place on the premises a
statement of the terms and conditions of the contract
before materials are furnished or labor is performed,
which notice must be kept posted, and when so posted
shall give notice to all parties interested of the terms
and conditions of the contract Any person willfully
tearing down or defacing such notice is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
1953
38-1 -21. Advance payments — Effect on subcon•
tractor's lien.
No payment made prior to the time when the same
is due under the terms and conditions of the contra a
shall be valid for the purpose of defeating, diminishing or discharging any lien m favor of any person
except the contractor, but as to any such hen such
payment shall be deemed as if not made, notwithstanding that the contractor to whom it was paid may
thereafter abandon his contract or be or become indebted to the owner for damages for nonperformance
of his contract or otherwise
1953
38-1-22. Advance payments under terms of contract — Effect on liens.
The subcont^actors, hens provided for in this chapter shall extend to the full contract price, but if at the
time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials the owner has paid upon the contract, in accordance with the terms thereof, any portion of the contract price, either in money or property, the lien of
the contractor shall extend only to such unpaid balance, and the lien of any subcontractor who has notice of such payment shall be limited to the unpaid
balance of the contract price No part of the contract
price shall by the terms of any contract be made pay able, nor shall the same or any part thereof be paid in
advance of the commencement of the work for the
purpose of evading or defeating the provisions of this
chapter
isss
38-1-23. Creditors cannot reach materials furnished, except for purchase price.
Whenever materials have been furnished for use in

38-1-24
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the construction, alteration or repair of any building,
work or other improvement mentioned in Section
38-1-3 such materials shall not be subject to attachment, execution or other legal process to enforce a m
debt due by the purchaser of such materials, other
than a debt due for the purchase money thereof so
long as in goc>d faith the same are about ic be applied
to the construction, alteration or repair of sucr. build
ing or improvement
isss
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to the labor, service, equipment, or materia!? furnished to each such subcontractor or original contractor.
(6) The person required by this section to give preliminary notice is precluded from making a claim for
any labor, service, equipment, or material which was
provided more than 45 days prior to the date the preliminary notice is given. The preliminary notice must
be given before a notice of lien is filed with the county
recorder pursuant to Section 38-1-7.
38-1-24. Cancellation of r e c o r d — P e n a l t y .
(7) The preliminary notice under this section shall
The claimant of any lien filed as provided herein,
on the payment of the amount thereof together with include:
(h) the name, address, and telephone number
the costs incurred and the fees for cancellation, shall
of the person furnishing the labor, service, equipat the request of any persoL interested in the propment, or material;
erty charged therewith cause said hen to be canceled
(b) the name and address of the person who
of record within ten days from the request, and upon
failure to so cancel his lien within the time aforesaid
contracted for the famishing of the labor, service,
shall forfeit and pay to the person making the request
equipment, or material; and
the sum of S20 per day until the same shall be can(c) the address of the project or improvement
celed, to be recovered in the same manner as other
or a drawing sufficient to describe the location of
debts.
i»5S
the project or improvement.
(8) (a) Service of a preliminary notice is sufficient
38-1-25. A b u s e of b e n right — P e n a l t y .
if the notice is deposited in the United States
Any person who knowingly causes to be filed for
mail, certified or registered, return receipt rerecord a claim of lien against any property, which
quested, postage prepaid. Service of the prelimicontains a greater demand than the sum due him,
nary
notice by mail is complete upon deposit of
with the intent to cloud the title, or to exact from the
the certified or registered mail.
owner or person liable by means of such excessive
(b> A preliminary notice served by mail may
claim of lien more than is due him. or to procure a m
be addressed to the original contractor at his
advantage or benefit whatever, i s guilty of a misdeplace of business, or his address as shown on the
meanor.
1*53
notice of commencement on file with t h e count}
clerk as required by Subsections (10) and ( H i .
38-1-26. A s s i g n m e n t of b e n .
All liens under this chapter shall be assignable as
(9) The applicability of this section, including the
other choses in action, and the assignee may com- waiver of rights or privileges granted or protected by
mence and prosecute actions thereon in his own name this section, may not be varied by agreement.
in the manner herein provided.
1353
(10) Any right to assert a defense of failure to comply with the preliminary notice requirements of this
38-1-27. Preliminary notice — Form of notice — section is void unless the original contractor files a
Contents of notice — Notice of com- notice of commencement of the project or improvemencement — County clerks to mainment with the county clerk for the county or counties
tain, index file — Payment of fees.
(1) This section relating to preliminary notices where the project is located within 30 days after corr does not apply to residential construction or to work mencement of the project The notice of commenceperformed in the development of subdivisions whose ment shall include the following(a) the name and address of the owner of the
end use is for residential construction For the purproject or improvement;
poses of this section, residential construction means
(b) the name and address of the original consingle family detached housing and multifamily attached housing up to and including fourplexes. and
tractor;
includes rental housing
(c) the name and address of the surety provid(2) Except subcontractors who are in privity of coning any payment bond for the project or improvetract with an original contractor or except for persons
ment, or if none exists, a statement t h a t a payperforming labor for wages any person claiming, rement bond was not required for the work being
serving the right to claim, or intending to claim a
performed;
mechanic's lien under this chapter for labor, service,
(d) the name of the project; and
equipment, or material shall provide preliminary no(e) the address of the project or improvement
tice to the origins) contractor a s prescribed by this
or ^ drawing sufficient to describe the location of
section Any person who fails to provide this prelum*
the project or improvement.
nary notice has no right to claim a mechanic's lien
(11) The county clerks for t h e individual counties
under this chapter.
(3; The preliminary notice required by this section of this state shall create and m a i n t a i n a file for the
shall be in writing and may be given at any time filing and maintenance' of the notices of commencement required under Subsection (10). The file shall be
during the course of the project or improvement.
(4) A person required by this section to give pre- cross indexed by the name of t h e original contractor.
liminary notice is only required to give one notice for the n a m e of the project or improvement, a n d t h e adeach project or improvement, which may include an dress or location of the project or improvement. The
entire structure or a scheme of improvements
count}- clerks shall establish a n d collect a fee for fi.(5"> If the labor, service, equipment, or material is m g a notice of commencement sufficient to pay for the
furnished pursuant to contracts with more than one cost of treating and maintaining t h e file T h e fee essubcontractor or with more than one original contrac- tablished and collectec may not be in excess of thtor, the notice requirements must be met with respect costs of creating and m a i n t a i n i n g such
file.
l&a*
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(a) he h a s furnished labor, services equipment, or material in the prosecution of the *ork
provided for in the contract for which i r e pavment bond is furnished under this chapter ar i
(b) he has not been paid in full within 90 days
after the last day on which he performed the
labor or service or supplied the equipment or material for which the claim is made.
(5) A n action under this section shall be brought in
a court of competent jurisdiction in the count}- whe~e
the contract was to be performed and not elsewner*
The action is barred if not commenced within one
year after the last day on which the claimant performed the labor or service or supplied the equipmes;
or material on which the claim is based. The oblige*
named in the bond need not be joined as a party to the
action. In any action upon a bond, the court may
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party, which fees shall be taxed as costs in the action
(6) The payment bond shall be exhibited tc ar>
interested person npon request

(7) In any suit upon a payment bond under this
chapter, the court shall award reasonable attorneys'
fees to the prevailing party.
is*s
14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment
bond — liability.

CHAPTER 2
PRIVATE CONTRACTS
Section
14-2-1

Definitions — Payment bond required —
Right of action — Notice — Attorneys'
fees
14-2-2
Failure of owner to obtain payment bond —
Liability
14-2-3, 14-2-4 Repealed
14-2-5
Preliminary notice requirement
14-2-1. Definitions — Payment bond required —
Right of action — Notice — Attorneys'
fees.
(.1) For purposes of this chapter
^aV| "Contractor means any person who is or
may be awarded a contract for the construction,
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or
improvement upon land
(b' "Owner" means any person contracting for
construction, alteration or repair of any building structure, or improvement upon land
(2' Before any contract exceeding $2,000 m
amount for the construction, alteration, or repair of
any building, structure or improvement upon land is
awarded to any contractor, the owner shall obtain
from the contractor a payment bond complying with
Subsection £3 The bond shall become brnoing upon
the award of the contract to the contractor
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or
sureties satisfactory' to the owner for the protection of
a!) persons supplying labor, services, equipment, or
material in the prosecution of the work provided for
in the contract in a sum equal to the contract price
4< A person shall have a right of action on a pa>ment bond under this chapter for an} unpaid amount
due him if

(1) Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bone
is liable to each person who performed labor or service or supplied equipment or materials under the
contract for the reasonable value of the labor or service performed or the equipment or materials furnished up to but not exceeding t h e contract price
(2) N o action to recover on this liability may be
commenced after the expiration of one year after the
day on which the last of the labor or service was performed or the equipment or material was suppLed b;
the person.
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a bond the
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party. These fees shall be taxed as costs in
the action.
19$$

14-2-3,14-2-4. Repealed.

is*-

14-2-5. Preliminary notice requirement
Except subcontractors who are in privity of contract with a payment bond principal or except for persons performing labor for wages, any person fum^r ing labor, service, equipment, or material for wn.:h £
payment bond claim may be made under this chapter
shall provide preliminary notice to the payment bond
principal as prescribed by Section 38-1-27 Anj person who fails to provide this preliminary notice ma;.
not make a payment bond claim under this chapter
The preliminary notice must be provided pnor :c
commencement of any action on the payment bone
198S
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58A-la-9. Licenses — Expiration — Notice — Renewal.
(Ij All licenses issued under this chapter, unless suspended or revoked,
expire on April 30 of each odd-numbered year.
(2^ The director shall notify, at least 30 days prior to the expiration date,
each licensed contractor of the impending expiration Notice shall be given by
mail addressed to each contractor's last known address, and the notice shall
enclose an application form for a renewal.
(3) An applicant for renewal of an existing license, on a form prescribed by
the division, accompanied by the required fee, filed with the division prior to
the expiration date, shall authorize operations as a contractor by the licensee
until actual issuance of the renewal license for the ensuing license period. All
applications for renewal of licenses shadl be filed with the division not later
than April 30. Upon failure to file, licenses shall be renewed only upon the
payment of the regular renewal fee and the established reinstallment fee. Any
licensee who fails to renew a lapsed license within six calendar months shall
apply for and receive a new license before he may do business as a contractor.
History: C. 1953. 58A-la-9. enacted by L.
1985, ch. 171, $ 2.
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Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees.
Intent*
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments,
and decrees to the court
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record
Statement of the Rule.
(1) In all rulings b} a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the
ruling shall within fifteen 15) days, or within a shorter time as the court ma)
direct file witl the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity
with the ruling
/ (2^ Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served
•' upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless

,03

OPERATION OF THE COURTS

Rule 4-505

Sj§ court otherwise orders Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court
^counsel within (5) days after service.
NVstipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing
' /presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the settleJit'and dismissal
?4)aUpon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon
Apposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court All
dgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted
;er signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a rej^/f must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage
^ 5 ) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner
|uf"to show whether the\ are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the
Sotion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding m which the judgment, order or
jjgcree is made
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall contain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the
social security number of the judgment debtor if known.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the
court Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is
based
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed
or, entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation wras
madVon the record
(9)' In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written
obligation, the plaintiff or plain tiffs counsel shall attach to the new complaint a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation.
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Rule 9

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 9. Pleading special matters.
(a^ (1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or
be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued m a representative
capacin or the lega] existence of an organized association of persons that
is made a party When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a part}' to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he
shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge, and
on such issue the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the trial.
(21 Designation of unknown defendant When a party does not
know the name of an adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, provided, that when the true name of
such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be
amended accordingly.
(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an action to quiet title wherein any of the parties are designated
in the caption as ttunknown," the pleadings may describe such unknown
persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or
interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto "
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a
person may be averred generally
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of
conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or
occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when so
made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial
establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence.
(d) Official document or a c t In pleading an official document or act it is
sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the art done in compliance
with law
(e) Judgment In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign
court judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient
to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with
particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or decision
shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts.
28
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(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading
averments of time and place are materia! and shall be considered kk~ al
o&er averments of materia] matter
(g)J5pecial damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall
^specifically stated
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not
necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute rebed
on, referring tc or describing such statute specifically and definitely by section
"number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision
relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted
the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing
that the cause of action is so barred.
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this
state, or an ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived
from such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or
ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or
other designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances The
court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof.
(j) Libel and slander.
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for
libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to
the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the action arose; but it
is sufficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken
concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so
published or spoken
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander,
the defendant may allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages,
and, whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence
the mitigating circumstances.
Compiler's Notes. — Tins rule is substantially similar to Rule 9, FRCP
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Fraud
—Forgery
—General accusations
Insufficient
Negligence
—Materiality of representation
—Misrepresentation
Not properly pleaded
Properly pleaded
Judgment
—Foreign judgment
Lack of capacity
—Failure to raise
Waiver.
—Specific negative averment

Libel and slander
—Actual harm
Mistake
—Mutual mistake.
Contracts.
Deeds
Special damages
—Accounting
—Defamation
—General and special damages
—Loss of earnings
—Notice of special damages
—Punitive damages
Allegations of fraud.
Statute of limitations
—Pleading
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-Y *

THE COURT

*

|

This Court, having further considered the

arguments of counsel as well as the authorities, both
statutory and case law, cited, is prepared to rule.
A R-le :I motion requires that this Court consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
against: whom the motion is directed.

In this instance,

the Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which

J
j

motion was argued and denied on the 4th of April of 19 8S
Neither party memorialized the ruling by filing or
submitting an order thereon, for this Court to conclude
that the summary judgment motion was partially granted
1 when that ruling is not supported by the minute entry and

'

wi th no transcript of that ruling is too great a leap of

j

i

| faith for this Court, Ms. Siegler.

j

The Plaintiff in this action in its Complaint has
1 asserted threp causes of action.

One is lien foreclosure

- against the owner of the property.
meruit

or unjust enrichment theory.

j
1

Two is the quantum
And three is the

payment bond which is a claim against the material payment
insurer, United Pacific Insurance Company.
The Defendant has filed an Answer alleeing affirmative I
waiver and estoppel and failure to give proper credit and
denial of the receipt of the materials in cuestion.
The Plaintiff has established by its evidence that the'
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items involved in electrical contracting were sold to the
subcontractor, Old Trapper Electric, a subcontractor of
the Defendant Ink ley.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff has

established that the items were of the type and approximate quantity necessary for use in the construction of the
Hunter Sta'rie Center.
The burden is on the Plaintiff to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence compliance with Title 14-2-1
regarding notice to establish by some believable evidence
that the materials went to and were utilized in the
project, that a valid lien has been filed in compliance
with Title 38-1-10 and following, and that when supplying
materials to a subcontractor with multiple accounts, that
Title 58-50-10 was complied with, as well as other
statutory requirements set forth in materialmen lien
and bonding provisions.
In this Court's view, the evidence has been
legally insufficient to survive the Rule 50 motion.

I an.

net persuaded that the Plaintiff has met its burden of
establishing to a legal sufficiency sufficient evidence tc
overcome the Rule 50 motion.
Accordingly, it is this Court's view that the motion
should be and is granted.
Mr. Fox, you prepare the appropriate order.
MR. FOX:

I will, your Honor.

I would request the
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Clerk make a transcript of the

Court's findings so that

we could prepare Findings of Fact.
THE COURT.

Very well.

I'm sure she has heard the

request.
Ccur: -.•_!. be m
XR

FCX:

recess.

Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded )
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1

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2
3
4 STATE OF UTAH

)
; SS

5 COUNTY OF SklZ

LA"E

)

6
7

I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify:

8

That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License No.

9 220,
10

and one of the official court reporters of the state of

Utah; that on the 14th day of June, 1989, I attended the
within matter and reported in shorthand the proceedings had

12
13

thereat; that later I caused my said shorthand proceedings
to be transcribed into typewriting, and the foregoing pages,

14 numbered from 2 tc 4, inclusive, constitute a full, true and
15 correct account of the Judge's Ruling, to the best of my
16 ability .
17

DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23rd day of

18 June, 1989.
19
20
2\

i. y« f & AC .sz64i*u,zzr
ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR

22
23
24
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC SUPPLY,
INC., a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
NO. 890735-CA
SHIRL B. INKLEY, an individual
d/b/a INKLEY CONSTRUCTION,
THE CORPORATION OF
THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, and UNITED
PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY
Defendants and Respondents.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

I, Lora C. Siegler, do hereby certify that I mailed, postage
pre-paid, to the office of Joseph R. Fox, Attorney for Defendants,
at 9160 South 300 West, Sandy, Utah 84070, one copy each of the
Brief of Appellant on this 18th day of January, 1990.

JJU.
Lora C. Siegler

